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FROM PARIS 2005 TO ACCRA 2008: WILL AID BECOME 
MORE ACCOUNTABLE AND EFFECTIVE?  
A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE AID EFFECTIVENESS AGENDA  
 
 
About this Document 
 
This draft position paper has been prepared by the International CSO1 Steering Group (ISG) 
coordinating the “CSO Parallel Process to the Ghana High Level Forum Network”. The ISG 
coordinating CSO Parallel Process to the Ghana High Level Forum network brings together 
various local, national, regional and international NGOs who are engaged in development issues, 
particularly the aid architecture and the aid effectiveness agenda. This network is involved in a 
multi-stakeholder process of engagement leading towards the High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, to be held in Accra, Ghana, in September 2008. 
 
This paper is being presented to CSOs around the world for further edits and suggestions, as well 
as endorsement sign-on. This position paper will then be presented to the High Level Forum III 
where CSOs have requested to speak to the Ministerial meeting.   
 
The network is keen to develop awareness of the aid effectiveness agenda at the local, national 
and international level and sees the Ghana HLF as an important opportunity for bringing about 
discussion and debate and the engagement of CSOs on the said agenda. CSO concerns include 
among others, governance and accountability, ownership, effective aid delivery, tied aid and 
conditionality, at the same time ensuring that the core issues of gender equality, human rights 
and solidarity in the aid architecture are seriously addressed. 
 
The list of current partner networks involved in this initiative include ActionAid International, 
Afrodad, Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), Association for Women’s Rights in 
Development (AWID), BOND (UK Aid Network), Canadian Council for International Cooperation 
(CCIC), CIVICUS, CONCORD (European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development), 
Eurodad, IBIS, IBON Foundation, Ghana CSO Aid Effectiveness Forum, SEND (Social Enterprise 
Development Foundation of West Africa), Reality of Aid, Social Watch, Third World Network, 
Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE). The International CSO Steering Group is 
currently under the chairmanship of IBON for the Accra High Level Forum.  
 
 
                                                 





Civil society organisations (CSOs) were present in 
2005 when donor country members of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD DAC), developing countries and multilateral 
institutions signed the Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid 
Effectiveness.2 Since then, diverse CSOs have been 
engaged in tracking this agreement, both 
internationally and in developing countries. CSOs 
have been raising a range of issues and bringing in 
different perspectives, trying to ensure that this new 
framework for aid effectiveness translates into 
effective and accountable development processes.   
 
CSOs argue that the only true measures of aid’s 
effectiveness are its contribution to the sustained 
reduction of poverty and inequalities; and its support 
of human rights, democracy, environmental 
sustainability and gender equality.  
 
CSOs are promoting a deepening of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, so that it addresses the 
concerns of all stakeholders in the development 
process. Government actions alone will not reduce 
poverty. CSOs are particularly concerned about the 
interests and representation of groups which are often 
excluded or marginalised, including women and 
women’s movements.  
 
CSOs call for a stronger language in the PD regarding 
gender equality and human rights issues. 
 
CSOs are also pushing for a broader interpretation of 
aid effectiveness in reforming aspects of the aid 
relationship including donor selectivity, further 
reducing loans in favour of  grants and nature of 
technical assistance. 
 
CSOs consider aid effectiveness one of a triad of key 
issues in development financing – the other two key 
issues being debt cancellation to end the debt crisis in 
developing countries, and for rich countries to meet 
their commitments to give 0.7% of GNI as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). Rich countries first 
committed to increase their ODA to this level in 1970 
and this commitment was reaffirmed in the Monterrey 
Consensus of 2002. But very few donors have fulfilled 
their promise.3  
 
CSOs proposals for aid effectiveness are premised on 
two other accompanying demands on development 
financing: 100% for debt cancellation and the end of 
                                                 
2 OECD, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, March 2005, 
available from: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf 
3 These countries are Luxemburg, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and 
The Netherlands. 
the debt crisis in developing countries and for rich 
countries and the scaling up of aid to 0.7% GNI as 
official development assistance. 
 
This policy paper outlines some of the key CSO 
critiques and concerns about the Paris agenda and its 
implementation, as well as some specific 
recommendations for the High Level Forum (HLF) to 
be held in Accra in 2008. 
 
Box 1: What is the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness? 
 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
agreed in March 2005, establishes global 
commitments for donor and recipient countries to 
support more effective aid in a context of a 
significant scaling up of aid. The intention is to 
reform the delivery and management of aid in 
order to improve its effectiveness. The reforms 
are intended to “increase the impact of aid […] in 
reducing poverty and inequality, increasing 
growth, building capacity and accelerating the 
achievement of the MDGs”. The PD outlines five 
principles which should shape aid delivery:  
OWNERSHIP: Developing countries will exercise 
effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies, and will coordinate 
development actions; 
ALIGNMENT: Donor countries will base their 
overall support on recipient countries' national 
development strategies, institutions, and 
procedures; 
HARMONISATION: Donor countries will work so 
that their actions are more harmonised, 
transparent, and collectively effective; 
MANAGING FOR RESULTS: All countries will 
manage resources and improve decision-making 
for results; and, 
MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY: Donor and 
developing countries pledge that they will be 
mutually accountable for development results. 
 
Signatories include 35 donor countries and 
agencies, 26 multilateral agencies and 56 
countries that receive aid. 
 
The PD specifies indicators, timetables and 
targets for actions by donor and partner 
governments and has an evolving agenda for 
implementation and monitoring of progress, up to 
2010. This includes a Third High Level Forum to 








2.  Introduction: The Paris Declaration is 
a Political Agreement 
 
The principles of ownership and accountability 
endorsed by the Paris Declaration are welcomed by 
CSOs as the right basis for relationships between 
donors and recipient governments.  Accountable aid 
relationships based on real ownership can help to 
support democracy and the empowerment of poor 
and marginalised people to claim their rights.  
 
Aid creates power relationships between donors, 
governments and citizens – the process of 
implementing, monitoring and evaluating the PD must 
recognise this. By crowding together and aligning their 
policies, donors increase their already significant 
power over aid recipients, which allows them to keep 
imposing their priorities and concerns. Radical change 
is needed to empower recipients and make aid 
accountable to all people and effective at meeting 
their needs and rights.  
 
Some donors have attempted to reduce the Paris 
agenda to a technical process for managing aid flows 
and lowering transaction costs, and have pushed 
much of the responsibility for change onto recipients.  
But reforming the aid system cannot be a ‘neutral’ 
technical process. For example, the PD largely 
ignores a number of key issues which are 
controversial in aid reform (e.g. conditionality, tied 
aid), but by excluding them it implicitly supports 
current practice – this is a political decision in and of 
itself. At the same time the framework creates new 
mechanisms of conditionality, such as the Joint 
Assistance Strategies. PD needs to focus on 
conditions for effective and sustainable development 
and for democratising the international cooperation 
processes. 
 
Recommendation 1: Recognise the centrality of 
poverty reduction, gender equality, human rights 
and social justice. 
 
The Accra HLF must ensure that the aid effectiveness 
agenda aims to reduce poverty, promoting gender 
equality and guaranteeing human rights and social 
justice. The AAA must commit to a work plan for 2010 
that would elaborate indicators and an inclusive 
process of assessment of new aid modalities in terms 
of their actual impact on the achievement of progress 
in poverty reduction, gender equality, human rights 
and social justice.  
 
The PD’s objectives, commitments, and assessment 
indicators have also been artificially separated from 
any consideration about how aid actually affects the 
conditions that sustain poverty and inequality.  
Development is a political process. It is essentially an 
issue of the poor claiming and realising their human 
rights.  
 
The Accra HLF presents an opportunity to deepen the 
current aid effectiveness agenda by explicitly 
addressing its relevance to these broader 
development goals. Deepening aid effectiveness in 
the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) requires 
recognition by all stakeholders that the modalities and 
partnerships of aid must be explicitly coherent with, 
and accountable to UN goals to achieve progress in 
poverty reduction, gender equality and human rights. 
Donors must be accountable and take responsibility 
for their actions, while all governments must spare no 
effort to meet their obligations to provide basic rights 
for their citizens.  
 
Linking the implementation of Paris Declaration to 
these key development goals puts the interests and 
rights of poor and marginalized people at the centre of 
the aid effectiveness agenda. Progress for each of 
these goals hinges on strengthening empowerment, 
local capacity, participation, transparency, leadership 
and joint responsibility, all of which are consistent with 
the intentions of the Paris Declaration. 
 
3. Making Democratic Ownership a 
Reality 
 
Ownership is essential, but must be democratic.  
CSOs believe that ownership is the cornerstone of 
development – unless countries are able to decide 
and direct their own development paths, development 
will fail to be inclusive, sustainable or effective.  
 
The ownership principle is meant to be a foundation of 
the Paris aid effectiveness agenda as well as other 
ongoing reform processes, including the ‘One UN’ 
reforms. However, the way ownership is understood is 
often limited, and based on the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) process4. While PRSPs have 
different expressions in different countries, these 
processes are seldom an authentic and ‘owned’ 
reflection of the citizens of poor countries – they often 
reflect the interests of a technical/political elite and the 
demands of key donors (the World Bank and IMF in 
particular). According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
“the autonomy of countries in designing their own 
growth and development strategies is circumscribed 
by the same considerations that dominated the 
structural adjustment programmes of the past two 
decades”.5  
 
                                                 
4 And monitored according to indicators developed by the World 
Bank. 
5 UNCTAD 2002, From Adjustment to Poverty Reduction: What’s 
new? Geneva, in TWN, Celine Tan. 
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Setting national and local development priorities in a 
country is a complex and ongoing political process, 
involving many stakeholders. This process must allow 
for real input and leadership from poor and 
marginalised populations and take into account 
specific national and local contexts. Some countries 
use the donor requirement of a PRSP to organise 
national debates around these issues, but PRSPs 
cannot be the only or main definition of ownership. 
Neither Joint Assistance Strategies often negotiated in  
secret between the donors and recipient country 
governments without public scrutiny or space for 
participation. 
 
Country ownership of development programmes 
should be understood not simply as government 
ownership, but as democratic ownership. Democratic 
ownership means that citizens (women and men) 
voices and concerns must be central to national 
development plans and processes (PRSPs, SWAPs, 
etc.) they must have access to resources, meaningful 
and timely information, and be active in 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It also 
means establishing legitimate governance 
mechanisms for decision making and accountability, 
including parliaments, elected representatives, 
national women’s machineries and organisations, 
CSOs representatives and local communities. 
 
Democratic ownership will only be possible if all 
actors are integrated into the national strategic 
planning, implementation and assessment.  
 
Recommendation 2: End all donor-imposed policy 
conditionality. 
 
The AAA should include a commitment to end all 
donor-imposed policy conditions and practice of using 
aid with foreign and economic interests, priorities and 
military interventions. The AAA should include as well 
recognition that such conditions undermine 
democratic ownership.  The AAA should set out a 
work-plan to achieve ambitious targets to simplify and 
reduce the overall number of conditions (including 
triggers, benchmarks etc) attached to the programme-
based approaches promoted by the Paris Declaration.  
 
One of the key recommendations of the 2006 Survey 
on Monitoring the Paris Declaration6 was that 
“development strategies need substantial 
strengthening” and have to be “determined by each 
country’s priorities, pace, and sequencing of reform”.   
 
                                                 
6 The 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, Volume 1 
Key Findings, Joint Venture of Monitoring, OCDE, based on the 
findings from the World Bank’s 2005 CDF Progress Report and the 
country profiles prepared for the WB’s Effectiveness Review, March 
2007. 
Donors must recognise that their activities can 
undermine democratic ownership. All imposed policy 
conditions, including benchmarks, triggers, and 
performance-based allocations, prevent recipient 
countries from exercising real policy choices and 
undermine democratic ownership of development and 
poverty reduction strategies. Policy conditionality, as 
distinct from fiduciary responsibility and accountability 
for aid expenditures, renders governments 
unaccountable to their citizens and their parliaments.  
Donors often undermine democratic accountability 
through secret policy dialogues with governments on 
aid and debt conditions. The use of aid as a tool to 
impose policy conditions has no place in an aid 
paradigm rooted in a commitment to ownership.  
Donor policy prescriptions continue to be attached as 
conditions for both debt cancellation and aid, and yet 
the PD contains no targets or indicators to reduce 
conditionality. There is also a concern that 
conditionality could even increase with the expansion 
of new aid modalities. CSOs are concerned that 
conditions are becoming broader and deeper, and 
continue to promote economic policies which are not 
in the interests of poor and marginalised people, but 
undermining their rights.  Donor harmonisation has 
the potential to reduce rather than increase policy 
space for recipients if it means that all donors make 
their aid conditional on the policy reforms demanded 
by the World Bank and IMF in particular.  This 
underlines the importance of tackling the question of 
conditionality at the 2008 High Level Forum.  
 
Recommendation 3: Donors and Southern 
governments must adhere to the highest 
standards of openness and transparency.  
 
Donors must commit in the AAA to the highest 
standards of openness and transparency. This should 
include: timely and meaningful dissemination of 
information, particularly during aid negotiations and 
about disbursements, and the adoption of a policy of 
automatic and fully disclosure of relevant information, 
in languages and forms that are appropriate to 
concerned stakeholders, with a strictly limited regime 
of exceptions. 
 
Southern governments must work with elected 
representatives and citizens’ organisations to set out 
open and transparent policies on how aid is to be 
sourced, spent, monitored and accounted for. This 
requires that government ministers and officials be 
accountable to their citizens, with effective 
mechanisms of answerability and enforceability, 
based on improved transparency of information about 
government policies and programmes. 
 
Aid suffers from a serious lack of transparency and 
openness. There are wide variations in the degree to 
which donors report in advance how much aid they 
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intend to disburse, and then how much they have 
disbursed, and on what terms. This makes it difficult 
for recipient governments to budget properly, and for 
CSOs, women’s organisations and citizens to 
scrutinise budgeting processes.  
 
Aid negotiations continue to take place behind closed 
doors - there is a lack of publicly available information 
on conditions, spending priorities and other aid terms. 
Key documents are often inaccessible; or, if made 
publicly available, are buried in donor websites rather 
than being actively disseminated to affected 
communities in formats and languages accessible to 
them.   
 
Increased transparency from donors would not only 
make them more accountable, it would also support 
Southern CSOs’ efforts to scrutinise budgets and hold 
their own governments to account. 
 
Southern governments must also become more 
transparent and open. The DAC’s 2006 Survey on 
Monitoring the PD recognised that “partner countries 
need to deepen their ownership of the development 
process by engaging citizens and parliaments more 
fully in planning and assessing their development 
policies and programmes”. 
 
Recommendation 4: Donors should support 
reforms to make procurement systems more 
accountable, not more liberalised. 
 
At Accra, governments should agree to focus entirely 
on strengthening procurement systems to be more 
accountable to citizens in recipient countries. Rather 
than rewarding countries that introduce greater (if not 
full) liberalisation, they should support recipients to 
look at different ways to link government procurement 
to broader economic and social goals through 
country-led Technical Assistance. 
 
CSOs welcome the commitment by donors to use 
country systems, such as government procurement 
systems rather than their own. We recognise that to 
do this, donors need to be ensured of the robustness 
of the country system. We do have some concerns 
that progress on this indicator is focused on 
developing country procurement systems rather than 
how far donors are actually using country systems. 
Furthermore, we are concerned that the methodology 
to assess the strength of government procurement 
systems rewards countries more highly if they do not 
discriminate against firms on the basis of their 
nationality.  
 
Transparency in government procurement is a 
‘Singapore issue’ which developing countries have 
refused to negotiate on at the World Trade 
Organisation, seeing it as a way of pushing 
procurement liberalisation. Government procurement 
is worth US$2,000 billion annually and liberalised 
procurement markets can provide good opportunities 
for firms from other, particularly developed, countries. 
The degree to which developing countries liberalise 
their procurement markets should be their choice and 
not in any way linked to either aid flows (through 
conditionality), choice of aid modality (such as budget 
support) and use of country systems. Donors should 
focus their support on assisting developing countries 
to build robust procurement systems that are 
appropriate to their contexts. It is hypocritical for 
donors to require this of recipients whilst many 
continued to tie their aid and procure from their own 
firms.  
 
Recommendation 5: The AAA must recognize 
CSOs as development actors in their own right 
and acknowledge the conditions that enable them 
to play effective roles in development.  
 
Donors and Southern governments should support 
the conditions which are necessary to enable CSOs in 
the South to fulfil their roles in the development 
process. CSOs need legal frameworks and 
mechanisms which provide for freedom of 
association, the right to organise and participate in 
national decision-making processes, and a free and 
open media.  CSOs also need predictable long-term 
funding – donors should explore new modalities of 
support to provide this. 
 
CSO are essential for creating a climate of social, 
political and economic change towards reducing 
poverty and inequalities and the fulfilment of human 
rights. Therefore it is vital to preserver their strategic 
role. 
 
CSOs have a vital role to play in development, 
although the roles assumed by CSOs are not a 
substitute for government obligations to meet their 
responsibilities to all their citizens. CSOs including 
women’s organisations, trade unions, peasants 
associations and other social movements are the 
expression of an active democratic citizenship, 
without which little progress can be made in 
governance or development. A democratic culture 
requires openness to policy and development 
alternatives, respect and encouragement for 
pluralities of views, human rights and gender equality. 
Embedding these principles into the policies and 
practices of donors, government and civil society 
organisations is a key challenge for the aid reform 
process. 
 
CSOs are development actors in their own right, 
rooted in the organisation of citizens to claim rights 
and hold governments and donors to account. CSOs 
have diverse characteristics and play significant roles 
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at different levels. For example, they have a role in 
providing effective delivery of development 
programmes, in social empowerment of poor and 
marginalized groups, in holding governments to 
account, and contributing to the realisation of human 
rights. Some CSOs are also donors or channels of 
donor assistance and many of them play the role of 
watchdogs. The key roles played by CSOs as 
development actors in their own right, as well as the 
enabling conditions that are necessary for them to be 
effective, need to be recognised in the aid 
effectiveness agenda.   
 
CSOs should not be instrumentalised in the aid 
effectiveness agenda as a means to implement 
commitments made by donors and governments in 
the PD (e.g. uncritical alignment of CSOs with country 
PRSPs).  Rather, CSOs must be given full play to 
hold donors and governments to account in 
implementing aid effectiveness principles, and in 
enriching the application of aid effectiveness 
principles and PD in their diverse roles in engagement 
with donors and governments, and especially in 
empowering the poor to claim their rights. 
 
CSOs have already taken many initiatives to improve 
their effectiveness and accountability (e.g. 
International Charter on Accountability, Sphere 
project) and are taking further steps to improve the 
partnerships between northern and southern CSOs in 
particular. 
 
The PD mentions the importance of civil society 
organisations in holding governments accountable. 
However, the current “new aid modalities” are putting 
additional challenges in CSOs access to resources. 
Donors need to explore new modalities for effective 
access to financial resources for CSOs, including 
women’s rights organisations. 
 
4.  Making Aid Accountable 
 
Accountability is the basis for effective aid, and 
should be based on rights. 
CSOs around the world argue that accountability is 
the only basis for effective aid. Donors, Southern 
governments and other actors in the aid system must 
be accountable for the impacts and development 
outcomes of aid.  CSOs believe that these impacts 
and outcomes must be ultimately assessed in terms 
of progress towards internationally-agreed human 
rights, including the right to development and 
associated economic and social rights.  Rights-based 
obligations should provide a normative and organising 
framework for accountability in the aid system. 
In addition, accountability mechanisms must include 
gender responsive indicators and results-based 
frameworks, in order to ensure steps towards the 
achievement of MDG37. CSOs demand the inclusion 
of specific instruments within the ‘new’ aid tools, 
particularly: gender budgeting, gender audits and  
monitoring of the implementation of international 
instruments for gender justice. 
 
Recommendation 6: Create an effective and 
relevant independent monitoring and evaluation 
system for the Paris Declaration and its impact on 
development outcomes. 
 
The AAA should create a system of independent 
monitoring and evaluation of the PD at international, 
national and local levels.  At the international level, 
new independent institutions will be needed to play 
this role, in order to hold donors to account for their 
overall performance.  At the national and local levels 
monitoring and evaluation should involve a range of 
stakeholders – including CSOs.  
 
Monitoring and evaluation should also take much 
more account of the links between reforms in aid 
modalities and development outcomes and progress 
towards human rights.  The AAA should initiate work 
to further explore these links.  The AAA should also 
set out a working plan to develop a more 
comprehensive and participatory process, led by 
developing country partners, including Southern 
CSOs, for determining more appropriate indicators 
and measurements of aid effectiveness.  The 2010 
review of the Paris Declaration commitments should 
be expanded to include the outcomes of this 
comprehensive assessment. 
 
The current monitoring process for the Paris 
Declaration is asymmetric – donors monitor 
themselves, while recipients are monitored by the 
World Bank and others. If the Paris process is to be 
credible, independent monitoring and evaluation is 
essential. 
 
There is insufficient confidence in the definition and 
measurement of many of the PD indicators and in the 
monitoring system. The current official monitoring 
process has allowed some donors to re-define 
commitments in order to over-state their performance.  
In contrast, monitoring of recipient governments has 
been in large part a review of compliance with norms 
and standards which were only discussed in a very 
limited way in Paris and which are, in many cases, 
defined by donors (e.g. use of World Bank 
assessments of ownership, mutual accountability and 
public financial management).  It is not acceptable 
that the monitoring and evaluation of Paris 
Declaration implementation is controlled by donors, 
                                                 
7 Promote Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. 
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both directly in individual countries and through the 
World Bank and the OECD-DAC. 
 
The monitoring process can also become a hidden 
door for the introduction of conditionality, when for 
example donors have pushed for the openness of 
government procurement to foreign bidders as a pre-
condition for using countries’ own procurement 
systems.  So, to be ‘effective’ in terms of aid, 
Southern countries face pressures to adhere to policy 
recommendations that have not been agreed in 
international fora such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).  
 
Recommendation 7: Introduce mutually agreed, 
transparent and binding contracts to govern aid 
relationships. 
 
Aid terms must be fairly and transparently negotiated 
with participation and accountability to people living in 
poverty and inequality. Donors and recipient 
governments should agree to base future aid 
relationship on transparent and binding agreements 
including clear commitments by donors on aid 
volumes and quality, with sanctions. In addition, it is 
vital that effective fiduciary mechanisms remain in 
place to ensure that aid money is spent for the 
purposes intended. 
 
These agreements should be independently 
monitored, as outlined above. 
 
Mutual accountability between donors and 
recipient governments must become a reality. 
At present, accountability in the aid relationship flows 
almost entirely in one direction: from recipient to 
donor. Donors are often unaccountable to the 
governments and citizens of the countries that their 
aid is supposed to be helping. In order to make 
mutual accountability a reality at the country level, 
donors must make transparent and binding 
commitments to which they can be held to account. 
 
Mutual accountability in the context of highly unequal 
power between donors and recipients also requires a 
commitment to a fundamental reform of International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs). The IFIs continue to have 
significant influence over the policy choices available 
to recipient countries, and harmonisation between 
donors could further increase this influence.  And yet 
the architecture of the international financial system 
continues to be highly undemocratic – recipient 
countries have very little voice in determining the 
policies of the IFIs.   
 
If the principles of mutual accountability are to 
become a reality, the IFIs must be substantially 
reformed to give recipient countries the chance to 
influence their policies – the AAA should recognise 
this and on the basis of a rights-based approach. 
 
Recommendation 8: Create new multi-stakeholder 
mechanisms for holding governments and donors 
to account. 
 
Multi-stakeholder mechanisms for holding 
governments and donors to account for the use of aid 
should be developed – these should be the real test of 
whether commitments to ‘mutual accountability’ and 
(indicator 12) are being met. They should be open, 
transparent and regular, with real room for citizens of 
southern countries to hold their governments and 
donors to account.  
 
The ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum 
could become a much better space for a mutual 
accountability exercise, with multi-stakeholders 
presence, being placed at the UN and governed by its 
rules. 
 
Mutual accountability must go beyond donors and 
governments. 
Southern countries often have weak accountability 
systems, without effective mechanisms for citizens 
and parliaments to hold the executive to account.  
Broadening aid accountability mechanisms to include 
a wider ranger of stakeholders is an opportunity to 
engage poor and marginalised people in the decisions 
which affect their lives. It is also important that new 
accountability arrangements build on existing 
international and regional human rights mechanisms 
of accountability (such as UN treaty bodies). 
 
Recommendation 9: Establish an equitable 
multilateral governance system for ODA in which 
to negotiate future agreements on the reform of 
aid. 
 
The aid reform process should be dealt with in a 
broader multilateral institution with clear and 
transparent negotiating mechanisms, equitable 
representation of donors and recipients, and 
openness to civil society. 
 
The aid reform process itself must be more 
accountable. 
The OECD DAC does not represent the aid-recipient 
countries who are the legitimate owners of 
development and aid financing, and yet it provides the 
key forum for reforming aid. This flawed ad hoc 
governance of the aid system renders the most aid 
dependant countries unable to hold strong positions in 
negotiations. It is important to establish a multilateral 
governance system for ODA based on equitable 
power sharing between donors and recipients, and 
with representation of civil society. The aid 
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effectiveness agenda should also be more effectively 
linked with the broader UN agenda on Financing for 
Development, concretely with the chapter on 
“addressing systemic issues”. 
 
5.  Aid Quality: donors must deliver 
 
Recommendation 10: Donors must be held to 
account for commitments they have already made 
under the PD. 
 
Targets for individual donors should be set for 2010 to 
ensure that they meet the commitments they made in 
the PD.  Donors must re-affirm their willingness to 
change the way they do business to meet basic 
standards of aid quality. 
 
In line with the commitment to reduce poverty and 
inequality (paragraphs 1 and 2), donors should ensure 
access to resources for country owned gender 
strategies. 
 
Donors must deliver basic standards of aid quality 
wherever they work. 
The PD contained some important commitments from 
donors to meet basic standards of aid quality.  
However, there is reluctance from some donors to be 
held to account for these commitments. Although 
targets have been set for individual recipients, donors 
have resisted setting themselves individual targets for 
2010. 
 
In addition, it has been widely recognise the crucial 
role of gender equality improvements for development 
effectiveness. Therefore, donors should ensure the 
efficient channelling of development aid in support of 
country owned gender policies on the basis of an in-
depth policy dialogue with partner governments and 
key non-government stakeholders. The potential 
benefits of the new aid effectiveness agenda may not 
be realised unless a gender perspective is adopted.   
 
Recommendation 11: Commit to giving aid for 
poverty eradication and the promotion of human 
rights 
 
Donors must commit to give aid mostly to eradicate 
poverty and inequalities and to promote human rights.  
They must end the practice of using aid for their own 
foreign and economic policy interests and priorities. 
 
Aid must be for the benefit of poor and vulnerable 
people. 
CSOs continue to be concerned that aid is often used 
to meet donors’ own foreign and economic policy 
interests, while ignoring the needs and rights of the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups. For example, aid 
has often been used to promote policies of economic 
liberalisation which have benefited companies from 
donor countries but harmed the interests and rights of 
poor and vulnerable people, especially women and 
girls. 
 
Recommendation 12: CSO urge for a stronger 
expression of commitments to untied aid. 
 
At Accra, donors should commit to expanding the 
agreement on untying aid to all countries, and all aid 
modalities (including food aid and technical 
assistance) and set up independently monitored 
targets for translating this commitment into practice. 
. 
All aid must be untied 
‘Tying’ of aid to the procurement of donor goods and 
services inflates costs, slows down delivery and 
reduces the flexibility of southern countries to direct 
aid where it is most needed. The primary beneficiaries 
of this practice are often firms and consultants in 
donor countries. Whilst donors have made some 
efforts to reform, they have excluded key areas such 
as food aid and technical assistance from their 
agreements, and in practice continue to heavily direct 
their aid budgets to their own firms.   
 
Donors have continued this practice while at the same 
time requiring recipients to open up government 
procurement to foreign competition. Untying should 
make aid more flexible and effective, but recipients 
should be allowed to maintain preferences for locally 
procured goods and services to ensure that more aid 
money remains in southern countries and used 
according to country decision making processes. 
 
Recommendation 13: Reform technical assistance 
to respond to national priorities and build 
capacity. 
 
Targets on improving technical assistance should be 
strengthened; including making sure that 100% of 
technical assistance is demand-driven and aligned to 
national strategies.  
 
 The right of recipient countries to contract according 
to their needs should be respected. More effective 
South-South forms of technical assistance should also 
be developed. 
 
Technical assistance must meet real capacity 
demands. 
The OECD has estimated that as much of half of all 
aid is in the form of technical assistance. Yet the 
recent Paris monitoring survey process revealed that 
several developing country governments believed that 
none of the technical assistance they received 
responded to their demands. Much technical 
assistance continues to be tied and overpriced, and is 




Technical assistance must be demand driven and 
aligned with national strategies, with an emphasis on 
building local capacity. 
 
Recommendation 14: Improve aid allocation to 
respond to needs. 
 
At Accra, governments should agree to develop an 
effective and transparent international mechanism to 
improve aid allocation so it goes to those most in 
need. 
 
Aid must be allocated fairly. 
A basic condition for aid effectiveness is that it should 
be allocated to the countries and areas which need it 
most.  However, the current system of allocating aid 
too often does not respond to need – some donors 
continue to allocate aid according to their own 
interests and objectives, others use allocation as a 
way to impose policy conditions and the system 
overall lacks coherence and coordination.  Many 
countries and critical issues receive paltry aid 
allocations: this is a situation which all agree must 
change, but the Paris Declaration is largely silent on 
this critical issue. 
 
Recommendation 15: New targets to improve 
multi-year predictability of aid. 
 
Donors should agree new targets in Accra to make 
multi-year, predictable and guaranteed aid 
commitments based on clear and transparent criteria. 
 
Aid must be more predictable 
Aid flows are often volatile – many donors make 
commitments for no more than one year and deliver 
aid late or not at all. Aid is often disbursed according 
to donors’ own priorities and timetables, without 
making sufficient efforts to respect and conform with 
national planning and development priorities, or the 
national budgeting timeframe.  All this makes it very 
difficult for recipients to prepare effective budgets, or 
to plan ahead, and makes it hard for CSOs to monitor 
aid flows and effectiveness.  
 
Donors should make multi-year aid commitments 
based on clear and transparent criteria, and should 
deliver those commitments on schedule, in a 
transparent manner. 
 
6.  Making the Accra High Level Forum 
Open and Accountable 
 
CSOs are essential if aid is to be made more 
effective.  As such, they must have a meaningful and 
sustained engagement and participation in the 
process of agreeing, implementing, monitoring and 
evaluating the aid effectiveness agenda. There should 
be special efforts to ensure the participation of 
women, indigenous people, disabled people, local 
communities and other marginalised people. 
 
Engagement with CSOs should be part of an 
institutionalised commitment by DAC members and 
the DAC Secretariat for regular and meaningful 
engagement with CSOs on a range of issues, not 
limited to concerns regarding aid effectiveness 
 
Recommendation 16: Ensure meaningful 
participation by CSOs in the Accra HLF. 
 
CSOs should be included in all the segments of the 
Accra HLF. CSOs perspectives must be part of the 
official discussions, including the Ministerial event and 
the drafting of the Accra Agenda for Action. 
 
The agenda for the HLF must reflect the concerns of 
groups which are often excluded from these 
processes. In particular, meaningful participation of 
women’s organisations in the whole HLF process, 
including through a roundtable on gender equality and 
aid effectiveness, is key to ensure that the voices, 
concerns and proposals of women are taken into 
account. 
 
A transparent, open and properly resourced consultation 
process should be organised in the run up to Accra, 
including: 
-the release of key papers early and in draft form with a 
civil society observer invited to all key meetings 
-clear mechanisms for participation at all levels, with 
enough resources allocated to ensure broad 
representation of diverse CSOs (including commonly 
excluded groups, such as women, peasants, 
migrants, refugees, indigenous people, youth and 
children).   
Clear parameters and accountability on how 
recommendations and proposals presented by CSOs 
will be seriously considered in the process should be 




AAA: Accra Agenda for Action 
CSOs: Civil Society Organisations 
DAC: Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD 
HLF: High Level Forum 
IFIs: International Financial Institutions 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 
ODA: Official Development Assistance 
OECD: Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development  
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PD: Paris Declaration 
PRSPs: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
SWAPs: Sector Wide Approach 
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development 










WE INVITE ALL CSOS TO SIGN UP 
ENDORSING THIS POSITION PAPER 
 
Endorsing Organisations up to November 07: 
ActionAid International, Afrodad, Arab NGO 
Network for Development (ANND), Association 
for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), 
BOND (UK Aid Network), Canadian Council for 
International Cooperation (CCIC), CIVICUS, 
Eurodad, IBIS, IBON Foundation, Ghana CSO 
Aid Effectiveness Forum, SEND (Social 
Enterprise Development Foundation of West 
Africa), Reality of Aid, Social Watch, Third World 
Network, Network Women in Development 
Europe (WIDE). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
